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Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua: A Landmark Case for the Inter-American System
by Claudio Grossman*
In 1996, the Republic of Nicaragua issued a Korean corpora-tion permission to cut trees in the communal lands of theMayagna indigenous community, the Awas Tingni. This com-
munity unsuccessfully tried to prevent the Government of
Nicaragua from proceeding further in this endeavor. Community
members attempted to solve the problem first by negotiating
with the government, and then by resorting to the national judi-
ciary. Finally, the case was brought to the Inter-American Com-
mission on Human Rights (Commission), and then before the
Inter-American Court on Human Rights (Inter-American Court).
This case marks the first time the Inter-American Court has been
called upon to address the property
rights afforded to indigenous popu-
lations in the Americas.
History of the Case
The Awas Tingni, an indigenous
community of approximately 630
individuals, have occupied land on
the Atlantic coast of Nicaragua for
generations. The land the tribe occu-
pies is rich in timber and other nat-
ural resources. Since the 1950s, the tribe has requested that the
Nicaraguan government demarcate the lands belonging to the
country’s indigenous populations. Once the lands are defined and
registered, the tribes would have title over the property and its nat-
ural resources. To date, Nicaragua has failed to demarcate these
lands.
On March 13, 1996, Nicaragua granted a 30-year timber-cut-
ting license to the Korean company, Sol de Caribe S.A. (SOL-
CARSA), permitting the exploitation of nearly 62,000 hectares
(nearly 160,000 acres) of tropical forest belonging to the Awas
Tingni community. The indigenous tribe was not consulted prior
to the negotiation of the timber contract and vehemently opposed
the intervention in their land.
In order to save their land’s resources, the Awas Tingni com-
munity presented a writ of amparo, a petition requesting the pro-
tection of recognized civil and political rights, to the Nicaraguan
Supreme Court on November 12, 1996. The Supreme Court
rejected the writ without explanation on February 27, 1997. The
lengthy delay between the petition and the Supreme Court’s
decision violated Nicaraguan domestic law, which mandates that
a writ of amparo be ruled upon within 45 days of submission.
A second writ of amparo was presented in March 1997. This writ
alleged that the government had failed to follow the required
procedures for granting a license to deforest land occupied by
indigenous peoples. The Nicaraguan Supreme Court ruled in favor
of the Awas Tingni and declared the timber license void. This deci-
sion was based on the grounds that the government had failed to
procure certain required signatures for the issuance of the timber
license. As one of the requisite steps to issue a timber license, the
government must consult local institutions, including indige-
nous populations, on the possible environmental and social
effects the tree-cutting operation could have, and obtain the
signatures of regional officials signifying the approval of the
indigenous groups. The government of Nicaragua failed to make
such consultations with the Awas Tingni, and to obtain the needed
signatures before granting the license to SOLCARSA. Although
the government was required by Nicaraguan law to comply with
the Supreme Court’s decision within 24 hours, it failed to take
measures to end SOLCARSA’s timber removal operations. 
Nearly a year after the Supreme Court’s second ruling, the Gov-
ernment of Nicaragua attempted to cure the fault with the license
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by obtaining the missing signatures. The Nicaraguan govern-
ment then retroactively authorized the license with the new sig-
natures. This attempt to cure the license was erroneous because
a government cannot retroactively give effect to a document the
courts have deemed nonexistent. The government finally complied
with the Supreme Court’s original mandate one year later, in
March 1998, without explanation for the delay in ending the
timber removal. 
Throughout these legal proceedings, Nicaragua has not pro-
vided compensation to the Awas Tingni. Additionally, the indige-
nous community incurred significant expenses and encountered
difficulties in pursuing their rights.
The writs had to be presented in a
language other than the tribal
tongue, and members of the Awas
Tingni had to travel great geograph-
ical distances in order to file the peti-
tions.
The Case before the Commission
In addition to pursuing justice
through dispute resolution mecha-
nisms in Nicaragua, the Awas Tingni brought their claim to the
Commission in October 1995. At this time, the Nicaraguan gov-
ernment was beginning to negotiate granting the timber license
to SOLCARSA despite the Awas Tingni’s repeated requests to
demarcate the lands of indigenous peoples in the region. The
Commission is a seven-member elected body that serves as the
continued on next page
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principal organ of the Organization of American States (OAS).
The Commission is mandated to protect and promote human
rights in the Americas and act as an advisory body to the OAS on
human rights issues. The Commission oversees States Parties’ com-
pliance with Inter-American human rights obligations, and
through its individual petition system, may be called upon to eval-
uate whether a State Party has violated the internationally pro-
tected rights of its citizens.
Following its processing of the case in accordance with applic-
able rules, the Commission concluded that Nicaragua had violated
the American Convention on Human Rights (American Con-
vention), a treaty Nicaragua ratified in 1979. Nicaragua was then
granted a period of time to comply with the recommendations
of the Commission and remedy the consequences of the violation,
particularly halting the removal of trees from Awas Tingni land,
and demarcating the lands belonging to indigenous populations
to prevent future property rights violations. The recommenda-
tion also required Nicaragua to delineate the borders of land held
by indigenous populations, to register these lands, and to provide
compensation to the Awas Tingni tribe for their lost resources.
Because Nicaragua did not comply with these recommendations,
the Commission brought the case before the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights. 
In the Inter-American System for the Promotion and Pro-
tection of Human Rights, the Commission, or State Parties to
the American Convention that have declared their acceptance
of the court’s compulsory jurisdiction, can bring a case before
the Inter-American Court. In situations where the Commission
brings the case, it acts as the victim’s representative before the
Inter-American Court. The Commission brought the Awas
Tingni case before the Inter-American Court on June 19, 1998,
with oral arguments heard on November 16, 2000. In my then-
capacity as first vice-president of the Commission, I acted as the
Commission’s delegate, representing the Awas Tingni com-
munity during the Court proceedings.
The Commission’s Arguments Before the Inter-American Court
The Commission first argued to the Inter-American Court that
the Government of Nicaragua should be held responsible for the
acts and omissions of its agents, who failed to guarantee the
rights of the Awas Tingni. Nicaragua failed to define the com-
munal lands of the Awas Tingni, or the lands of other indigenous
communities in Nicaragua. The government also failed to take
effective measures to ensure the property rights of the Awas
Tingni in their ancestral lands. The Commission also argued
that the Nicaraguan government should be held responsible for
the affirmative actions of its local representatives, who violated the
Awas Tingni’s property rights. These actions include granting the
license to SOLCARSA and attempting to cure the license rather
than cease logging.
These actions and omissions by the Nicaraguan government
constitute violations of Articles 1, 2, 21, and 25 of the American
Convention. The principle of nondiscrimination, laid down in Arti-
cle 1 of the Convention, forbids state action that discriminates
against indigenous populations. Indigenous populations are
specifically mentioned in Article 1 because of their past history
of discriminatory treatment, and the need to prevent such dis-
criminatory treatment in the future. One of the greatest mani-
festations of this discrimination has been the lack of effective state
guarantees for the traditional forms of use and possession of
lands and resources belonging to indigenous groups. Nicaragua
failed to clearly demarcate the lands belonging to indigenous
groups, which is necessary in order to afford them proper pro-
tections. The UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Dis-
crimination has observed that “in many regions of the world
indigenous peoples have been, and still are being, discriminated
against, deprived of their human rights and fundamental freedoms
and . . . have lost their lands and resources to colonists, commercial
companies, and state enterprises. Consequently the preserva-
tion of their culture and their historical identity has been and still
is jeopardized.” This situation of historical bias was also empha-
sized during the seminar convened by the UN on “The Effects of
Racism and Racial Discrimination on the Socioeconomic Rela-
tionships between the Indigenous Peoples and the States.” The
seminar concluded that “indigenous peoples had been, and still
were, victims of racism and racial discrimination.” The report on
the seminar stated, “[r]acial discrimination against indigenous
peoples is the outcome of a long historical process of conquest,
penetration, and marginalization, accompanied by attitudes of
superiority and by a projection of what is indigenous as ‘primi-
tive’ and ‘inferior.’ The discrimination is of a dual nature: on the
one hand, gradual destruction of the material and spiritual con-
ditions [needed] for the maintenance of their [way of life]; on
the other hand, attitudes and behavior signifying exclusion or neg-
ative discrimination when indigenous peoples seek to participate
in the dominant society.” 
The elimination of the historical discrimination against indige-
nous peoples requires faithful monitoring of their human rights,
including the right to property. The obligation of the State is to
guarantee the rights contained in the American Convention in
a non-discriminatory manner, particularly with regard to prop-
erty rights in land and natural resources. Article 24 of the Con-
vention, which establishes the right to equality under the law,
strengthens this obligation.
Article 2 of the Convention obligates Member States “to
adopt, in accordance with their constitutional processes and the
provisions of this Convention, such legislative or other measures
as may be necessary to give effect to those rights or freedoms.”
This provision assumes a high importance when it concerns sec-
tors of the population that historically have not been able to enjoy
fully their human rights. As a result, the Inter-American
continued on next page
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Commission declared in a 1972 resolution: “[i]n international law
generally, and in the Inter-American System specifically, special
protection is required so that indigenous peoples can exercise
their rights fully and equitably in comparison to the rest of the
population. Furthermore, it may be necessary to establish special
measures of protection for indigenous peoples to guarantee
their physical and cultural survival—a right protected in several
instruments and international conventions.” Article 21 of the Con-
vention establishes that “[e]veryone has the right to the use and
enjoyment of his property. The law may subordinate such use and
enjoyment to the interest of society.” This article, examined in light
of the fundamental principle of non-discrimination established
in the Convention, necessarily includes protection for those
forms of property that are based on the patterns of land posses-
sion typical to indigenous communities. The Awas Tingni com-
munity has property rights to lands and natural resources based
on a pattern of use and ancestral, traditional occupation, thus enti-
tling them to the protections of Article 21 of the Convention as
well as other applicable provisions of international law. 
Such forms of property are recognized explicitly and uncon-
ditionally by the Political Constitution of Nicaragua. The
Nicaraguan constitution “recognizes the existence of the indige-
nous peoples that enjoy the rights, duties and guarantees allocated
in the Constitution . . . [and] the communal forms of property
over the lands of the Communities of the Atlantic Coast. Equally,
[the state] recognizes the possession, use, and enjoyment of the
waters and forests of its community lands.” Nicaragua ensures to
these communities the enjoyment of its natural resources, the
effectiveness of its forms of community property, and the free
choice of its authorities and representatives. 
The Nicaraguan Statute of Autonomy for the Regions of the
Atlantic Coast of Nicaragua (Statute of Autonomy), based on these
articles of the constitution, defines community property as “the
lands, waters and forests that have belonged traditionally to the
communities of the Atlantic Coast.” Through the Nicaraguan
constitution and the Statute of Autonomy, the Nicaraguan legal
framework incorporates the notion of property ownership based
on the customary system of land use and possession that has
historically or traditionally existed among the indigenous com-
munities of the Atlantic Coast.
Nicaragua also violated the right to judicial protection granted
in Article 25 of the Convention. Nicaragua failed to guarantee an
effective, simple, and prompt recourse to answer the claims of the
Awas Tingni community pertaining to their rights to utilize their
lands and natural resources. Although the Supreme Court even-
tually provided a decision favorable to the Awas Tingni, there were
extreme delays both in the Supreme Court’s rendering a decision
and in the government’s following through with the Court’s
instruction. Nicaragua was so slow in providing justice to the
Awas Tingni that the government took over a year to stay the defor-
estation. 
The Commission limited its argument to focus on Articles 1,
2, 21, and 25, but the government actions that led to this case
affected many other articles of the Convention. The very existence
of the Awas Tingni tribe depends on the territorial space that it
occupies. The lives of the members of the Awas Tingni commu-
nity rely substantially on the agriculture, game, and fishing that
they carry out in areas bordering their villages. These subsis-
tence activities are part of the community’s culture and are
closely linked to the family relations and to their social organi-
zation. Within the area that the Awas Tingni inhabit and use, there
are identified burial grounds and other sites of religious signifi-
cance. Accordingly, in addition to the rights previously men-
tioned, the actions of the State of Nicaragua also violated the rights
to life (Article 4), honor and dignity (Article 11), freedom of con-
science and of religion (Article 12), freedom of association (Arti-
cle 16), protection of the family (Article 17), and movement
and residence (Article 22).
Analysis of this Case under other International Law Treaties
Nicaragua is a signatory to several international conventions
that the government has violated through its actions affecting the
Awas Tingni. Nicaragua is a party to the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which recognizes in Arti-
cle 27 the right of minority groups to the protection of “all those
characteristics that are necessary for the preservation of their cul-
tural identity.” Article 27 stipulates that “[i]n those States in
which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons
belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in com-
munity with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own
culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use
their own language.”
The UN Human Rights Committee, formed under the ICCPR,
has confirmed that for indigenous groups, such as the Awas
Tingni, traditional land possession is an aspect of the enjoyment
of its culture protected by Article 27 of the ICCPR: “culture man-
ifests itself in many forms, including a particular way of life asso-
ciated with the use of land resources, especially in the case of
indigenous peoples. That right may include such traditional
activities as fishing or hunting and the right to live in reserves pro-
tected by law.”
Furthermore, Nicaragua has undertaken responsibilities under
the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination. This Convention focuses on the right to
equality and, in particular, it obliges States Parties to eliminate
any form of racial discrimination. As has already been observed,
the principle of non-discrimination has particular significance
when it concerns indigenous peoples and the maintenance of their
traditional or customary forms of land possession. As a result,
within its mandate of safeguarding the fulfillment of the afore-
mentioned Convention, the UN Committee on the Elimination
of Racial Discrimination “calls upon the States Parties to recog-
nize and protect the rights of indigenous peoples to own, develop,
control and use their communal lands, territories, and resources
and where they have been deprived of their lands . . . or used with-
out their free and informed consent, to take steps to return
those lands and territories.”
In short, the Awas Tingni, as well as the other indigenous
communities of the Atlantic coast of Nicaragua, have rights to
lands and resources based on traditional patterns of land pos-
session. These rights, recognized by the Nicaraguan constitu-
tion and the Statute of Autonomy, are also protected by Article
21 of the American Convention and provisions of other inter-
national conventions that legally bind Nicaragua. 
The Commission’s Petitions to the Court
The Commission requested the Inter-American Court to
declare that the Government of Nicaragua violated Articles 1, 2,
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as torture, despite the previous decision of the judge that the lat-
ter crime was subject to statutory limitations. 
Castañeda’s decision is a correct interpretation of the rationale
of Judge Luna. In addressing the Argentine impunity laws, Judge
Luna held that the international community must not recognize
internal provisions, such as amnesties or other laws designed to
impede international justice, because the interests of the interna-
tional community in general, and of the victims of the crimes in
particular, transcend any particular or national interest of a State.
The same reasoning applies to laws that impose statutes of limita-
tions based on the passage of time, like the Mexican law that
allows statute of limitations to run for torture. There might be a
conflict if the rules that impose a statute of limitations were set in
the constitution. Statutory limitations, however, are not contem-
plated in the Mexican constitution, but are provided for only in sec-
ondary laws such as the criminal code (Articles 100 to 115). Thus,
the provision of Article 6 of the Convention Against Torture cre-
ating the obligation to prosecute or extradite (aut dedere aut judi-
care) when an alleged torturer is under the jurisdiction of a State
Party preempts the secondary internal rule that Judge Luna applied. 
In addition, Mexico signed the Convention on the Non-
Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes
Against Humanity on July 3, 1969, years before the alleged com-
mission of Cavallo’s crimes. This Convention provides in Article
1 that no statutory limitation shall apply to war crimes or crimes
against humanity irrespective of the date of their commission.
Under Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
Mexico has an international obligation not to defeat the object and
purpose of the treaty. In the present case, the object and purpose
of the Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limita-
tions is to punish such crimes regardless of internal rules on
statutory limitations and irrespective of the date of their com-
mission. Here, torture fits under the rubric of crimes against
humanity and, as such, no statutory limitations apply. Fortunately,
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs amended the mistake of the Judge
Luna, avoiding Mexico’s potential breach of its international
obligations.
The Amparo or Habeas Corpus Proceedings 
After the decision of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ricardo
Miguel Cavallo filed a writ of habeas corpus against this decision before
another federal judge. In Mexico, habeas corpus is contemplated
under the broader writ of amparo, which applies to any decision of
an administrative agency that may affect a constitutional right. In
the Cavallo case, the amparo proceedings before the federal district
court are currently pending, and it will likely go to the Supreme
Court if it considers the case of institutional importance.
It is important to note that habeas corpus or amparo pro-
ceedings in Mexico are not an appeal against previous decisions;
instead they constitute independent trials to review the consti-
tutionality of administrative acts—in this case the extradition
decision. The importance of this lies with the fact that the
Supreme Court is called upon to decide whether the extradition
process was done in accordance with the Mexican constitu-
tion. In this case, the issues raised by constitutional standards
are intimately related to the manner of incorporation of inter-
national treaty obligations into domestic law. Thus, the eventual
outcome of the Cavallo case in Mexico will have enormous
repercussions as a matter of constitutional, international, and
even comparative law. The ultimate fate of Cavallo lies in the
federal courts’ decision. All of us should stay tuned. 
*Juan E. Méndez is Professor of Law and Director of the Center for Civil
and Human Rights at Notre Dame Law School. He is also a member of
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and an alumnus of
the Washington College of Law (1981). Salvador Tinajero-Esquivel is an
LL.M. candidate at Notre Dame Law School.
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21, and 25 of the American Convention. The Commission asked
the Inter-American Court to order Nicaragua to pay reparations
to the Awas Tingni in accordance with Article 63.1 of the Con-
vention. Under this article, if a State is found responsible for vio-
lating the Convention, the Inter-American Court may order the
State to take any and all measures to ensure the negative conse-
quences of the violation are redressed. In the Awas Tingni case,
the Commission asked that Nicaragua be required to demar-
cate the territorial boundaries of its indigenous populations and
to abstain from granting licenses allowing the use or removal of
natural resources from the Awas Tingni land until the precise
demarcation has taken place.
As part of Nicaragua’s restitution to the Awas Tingni, the
Commission requested that the government provide compen-
sation, both material and moral, for the suffering the community
experienced as a result of the State’s actions. The Commission
also requested the State pay for the legal expenses incurred by
the Awas Tingni to defend themselves in Nicaragua, before the
Commission, and before the Inter-American Court.
The Importance of this Case
This is a landmark case in the Inter-American System for the
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights. It is the first case
brought before the Inter-American Court concerning the rights
of an indigenous population. It is appropriate that the first
such case should examine the property rights of an Indian
group because the very culture and existence of the Indian
community depends upon the land on which they reside.
This case is also important because it shows the value of the
Inter-American System as an avenue to debate (and hopefully
settle) very important and complex legal matters. Nicaragua
participated fully in the proceedings, showing the vitality of the
Inter-American System’s framework. Also, Nicaragua’s active par-
ticipation renders illegitimate any later non-compliance with the
Inter-American Court’s decision by the government. For the
Awas Tingni, this case also opens up the possibility to achieve
justice and to establish principles that will help not only their
community, but also establish precedent for future cases involv-
ing the rights of indigenous peoples.
The Commission expects a ruling from the Inter-American
Court on the case of Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua by the end of
2001. 
*Claudio Grossman is Dean of the Washington College of Law, a Co-
Director of the Center for Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, and
President of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.
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